PowerShell's parameter binder uses the conversion that 3.1 fixed for
every -SecurityDescriptor parameter, so a descriptor that Get-Acl
returns, never meant for these cmdlets, now binds where it used to be
a binding error. Two more consequences of that surfaced:
With the default module setting GetInheritedFrom ($true), Get-NTFSAccess,
Get-NTFSAudit, Get-NTFSOrphanedAccess, and Get-NTFSOrphanedAudit stopped
with the InvalidOperationException that a previous fix added for a
descriptor without an item; a cmdlet user has no parameter to avoid it.
GetFileSystemAccessRules and GetFileSystemAuditRules now treat
getInheritedFrom as false for such a descriptor instead of throwing: the
entries come back with no source, the same as an entry whose source
Windows cannot name.
The private constructor that wraps a descriptor directly marked every
section, including Audit, as read; Get-Acl never reads Audit unless
-Audit is given. This made HasAuditSection wrongly report true, so the
existing #109 check let Get-NTFSAudit go on with no audit data instead
of reporting that the descriptor has none, and let Get-NTFSInheritance
report AuditInheritanceEnabled as a real value instead of null
(unknown). The constructor now includes Audit in the sections only when
the descriptor's binary form actually carries a SACL, the same test
HasSystemAcl already uses.
Get-NTFSOwner, Get-NTFSSimpleAccess, Get-NTFSOrphanedAccess,
Get-NTFSEffectiveAccess, and Add-/Remove-NTFSAccess with such a
descriptor already worked; Set-NTFSSecurityDescriptor already reported
a clear, non-terminating error. A review finding on the earlier fix is
also addressed: two assertions read a property through reflection
instead of a plain PowerShell property access, which silently turns a
throwing getter into $null without a trace and so could not tell a
getter that throws from one that legitimately returns null.
Every existing behavior for an item that is not null is unchanged.
Public signatures are unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: AI Assistant <ai@example.com>
3.1 made a FileSystemSecurity2 without an item reachable from a .NET
caller (the conversions from FileSecurity and DirectorySecurity), but
six sibling call sites still dereferenced the item without checking it
first, so a caller who converted a FileSecurity or DirectorySecurity
and then read its entries, owner, inheritance, or effective access met
a NullReferenceException instead of a usable result.
GetFileSystemAccessRules and GetFileSystemAuditRules (the
FileSystemSecurity2 overload) now give each returned entry the same
null FullName that the descriptor itself reports; asking for the
source of an inherited entry (getInheritedFrom) needs the path of the
item, so it now throws one clear InvalidOperationException instead,
naming the reason, when the descriptor has none. FileSystemOwner and
FileSystemInheritanceInfo give a null FullName (and Name) the same
way; FileSystemOwner.ToString, which must never return null, gives an
empty string instead, since there is no other representation to fall
back to. The FileSystemAccessRule2(rule, item) constructor, which
EffectiveAccess.GetEffectiveAccess uses to build its result, now
accepts a null item the same way, so effective access can be
calculated for such a descriptor and the result names no path.
Every existing behavior for an item that is not null is unchanged;
only a .NET caller that reads such a descriptor can notice the
difference, and only for the better: a usable result or a clear error
instead of an unrelated NullReferenceException. Public signatures are
unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: AI Assistant <ai@example.com>
When Windows cannot name the folder of an inherited entry, such as for an item that was deleted after its descriptor was read or for a folder above it that the user cannot read, the module fills InheritedFrom with a fallback text. The callers removed the last character of every source, which belongs to the trailing backslash of a real folder, so the fallback read 'unknown paren'. The fallback also named an unknown parent for explicit entries, which have no source. Remove only a trailing backslash, and name an unknown parent for inherited entries only.
The regression tests fail without the fix in all four configurations for access entries and in both elevated configurations for audit entries. The cmdlet pages name the text, and the help file is generated again.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: AI Assistant <ai@example.com>
Equals of FileSystemAccessRule2, FileSystemAuditRule2, and
FileSystemSecurity2 cast its argument to the .NET type, which throws for
the wrapper types themselves: -eq and -contains, and in PowerShell 7 also
Select-Object -Unique and Compare-Object, stopped with an
InvalidCastException. GetHashCode of FileSystemSecurity2 read a field
that is never set and threw a NullReferenceException. Two objects are now
equal when they hold the same entry or descriptor, like the .NET types.
InheritedFrom: Win32.GetInheritedFrom returned the sources of the SACL
whenever the descriptor had one, also for the access entries, and the
callers gave the filtered entries of -ExcludeExplicit the sources of the
first entries of the ACL. Get-NTFSAccess -SecurityDescriptor stopped with
an ArgumentOutOfRangeException for a descriptor with audit entries, as
Get-NTFSSecurityDescriptor reads them in an elevated session. The method
now takes the ACL of the entries, and the callers map the sources before
they filter.
The coverage report of rc6 pointed at both; each test fails without its
fix.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: AI Assistant <ai@example.com>
Defect 7. FileSystemAuditRule2.GetFileSystemAuditRules set the
InheritanceEnabled property of every audit entry from
AreAccessRulesProtected, the protection of the DACL. It now uses
AreAuditRulesProtected, so the property, and the "Inheritance enabled"
header of the audit view, describe the audit entries.
Tests/Audit.Tests.ps1: 1 test on an in-memory security descriptor whose
SACL is protected and whose DACL is not.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: AI Assistant <ai@example.com>
Raimund Andree
Raimund Andée